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UE, and
will be seen as the party responsible for any events
(whether chargeable or not) involving her UE.
Therefore the user shall have full control over all chargeable and
non-chargeable events initiated by her UE (“event” includes responses made
by the UE to external events, e.g. the acceptance by the UE of an incoming
call). This control can be
exercised either by the giving of explicit permission at the time of the event
or by the giving of implicit permission to the events by the agreement to an
event schedule listed clearly in a user profile.
The user
shall be able to request the logging of specific network events initiated by
MExE UE applications/applets.
The privacy of user data in the UE is of
paramount importance.
The SIM/USIM and operator controlled
areas within the terminal are the property of the network operator.
The network operator shall therefore have full control over access to the
SIM/USIM and operator controlled area The operator shall also have full control
over data, excluding personal user data, transmitted to or from the SIM/USIM and
the operator controlled terminal area and all events initiated by the SIM/USIM
or operator controlled area (“event” includes responses made to external
events, e.g. the response to a command sent from the ME).
As the user cannot know the capabilities
of any MExE executables transferred from a MExE service environment before
transfer, the UE MExE environment shall ensure that transferred MExE executables
cannot compromise the above principles.
For MExE executables of security
operator, manufacturer and user trusted domains , as defined in clause 3, it
shall be possible to authenticate the identity of the body that authorised the
application, applet or content.
There shall be a secure, unforgable
means for assigning the security domains defined in section 3 to the MExE
executables transferable from the MExE service environment.
The certification of authorisation
associated with MExE executables transferable from the MExE service environment
shall be transferred with the certified material.
The MExE UE shall be able to verify the
security domain, as defined in section 3, of MExE executables transferred
from the MExE service environment.
The verification process in the UE
itself shall not compromise the security of the functionality and content in the
UE
Transferred material that fails
verification shall not be installed and shall be deleted by the terminal as soon
as possible.
MExE executables that cannot be verified
due to the absence of required verification information in the UE, shall be
considered as untrusted material,
as defined in section 3.
The events that MExE executables are
given permission by the user to initiate shall be securely recorded in the user
profile.
There shall be mechanisms within the
MExE UE for ensuring that applications cannot have access to UE functionality
and content beyond that allowed by their security domain, as defined in section
3.
It shall be possible to for the user to
downgrade MExE executables of operator, manufacturer or user trusted domain
status to untrusted status, at installation or at any other time.
The MExE UE shall be able to detect if
MExE executables transferred from the MExE service environment have been
modified since they were assigned a security level.
MExE executables shall not be
transferred to a MExE UE without the explicit permission of the UE user
immediately prior to transfer or implicit permission via the user profile.
Applications and applets transferred to
a MExE UE shall not be able to initiate events without the explicit permission
of the UE user immediately prior to event initiation or implicit permission via
the user profile.
The user profile data for transfer and
event initiation cannot be changed without the explicit agreement of the user.
The user shall be able to abort or
suspend any on-going call that has been set up automatically by an application.
The integrity of the SIM or USIM and
other security mechanisms shall not be compromised by the introduction of MExE
services.
The user shall be able to request the
logging of specific network events initiated by MExE UE applications/applets.
MExE UE applications/applets shall not
be able to send command RUN GSM ALGORITHM to the SIM.
The security domain of MExE executables
shall be graded according to the measure of authorisation which they have been
designated. The following 3 (the “sandbox” in which untrusted MExE
executables runs is not considered to be a domain) domains shall be supported
for MExE executables:
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MExE Security Operator Domain (used by the HPLMN operator);
MExE executables designated at this security domain have been authorised
by the network operator (i.e. HPLMN),
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MExE Security Manufacturer Domain (system
MExE executables);
MExE executables designated at this security domain have been authorised
by the MExE UE manufacturer.
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MExE Security User Trusted Domain (trusted applications, applets and
content);
MExE executables MExE executables designated at this security domain have
been written by user trusted software developers and verified as user trusted
domain material (but not with regard to their content) via organisations such as
certification authorities.
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MExE Security Untrusted (untrusted applications, applets and content);
Untrusted MExE executables have not been supplied with an associated
authorisation, or the authorisation cannot be verified due to the absence of
required verification information in the MExE UE.
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